171
C.O.S. 88.
APPENDIX I
CHINA. THE POLICY OF RETALIATION.
Memorandum by the Foreign Office.
THE Foreign Office is in favour of the principle of immediate retaliation against Chinese guilty of outrages against British lives and property, but as the adoption of such a policy would involve placing a very heavy burden of responsibility on the Commander-in-Chief and on the subordinate naval officers, who would have to take action without awaiting further instructions or sanction from the Home authorities, it seems desirable to define with the utmost possible precision the exact limits of the action which it is permissible to take, and the occasions when it should be taken. The Foreign Office view is that the naval forces should avoid being drawn into direct action against mobs or against the civilian population generally. The only occasion which would justify such action would be some mob outrage which brought foreign lives into urgent and imminent danger. In all other cases of outrages by mobs or civilians where property is in danger of destruction or foreign life is placed in peril, but not imminent peril, the action of the naval forces should be directed rather at military objectives in the immediate vicinity with a view to forcing the Chinese military commanders to assume and carry out the responsibility for affording adequate protection which properly belongs to them.
Where outrages are committed by Chinese soldiers the retaliation should be immediate, and should be of such a nature as to inflict punishment on the real offenders. By this it is not necessarily meant that the guilty soldiers themselves should actually be fired on, for on many occasions it will be found impossible to fire on the soldiers or to expel them from property which they may be destroying without inflicting serious injury on the civilian population, on the property of innocent parties, perhaps even of British subjects, or becoming involved in street fighting from which extrication might be difficult. In most cases action should preferably be taken against military objectives, such as forts, barracks or military headquarters -provided this can be done without serious risk to the civilian population-but in no case should action be taken at a place remote from the scene of the outrage. Finally, it should be very clearly laid down that while the action taken should be designed to procure a cessation of the outrages and adequate apologies or redress, it should in no case be excessive or out of proportion to the gravity of the offence. It should not, for example, be continued indefinitely, even though it may have failed in its effect.
In addition to defining the nature of the retaliatory measures which it is proposed to adopt, it is also necessary to specify the occasions when it would be desirable and permissible to adopt them. The simplest case is that of firing by forts or soldiers on any of His Majesty's ships or on any British ship. In such a case the naval officer should be instructed not only to return the fire, but, if necessary, to turn back and continue firing until the hostile battery is silenced or destroyed. Other cases of outrages by Chinese troops appear to fall into three categories, namely, those which-
(a) endanger lives;
(b) endanger property;
(c) violate rights.
It may be difficult in practice to separate (a) and (b), but punitive action should in no case be taken without prior sanction from home merely to restore rights which have been violated, as, for example, for the recovery of a concession or for the release of cargo detained for payment of some illegal tax. Punitive action should be confined to cases where lives and property are actually placed in imminent peril by the actions of Chinese troops. In those cases where property only is endangered, action should not be taken unless there is actual deliberate and wanton destruction or seizing of property on an extensive scale. In such cases it is especially necessary to bear in mind the caution that, though punitive action may be resorted to, it must not be excessive but must bear some proportion to the outrage in question.
!
5
The objects to be attained by punitive action, the occasions on which and the limits within which it should be employed, the dangers and risks which have to be avoided all these should be embodied in instructions which it would be primarily the function of the Chiefs of the Staff to draw up. It is, of course, realised that it is impossible to draft instructions capable of being applied to every contingency that may arise, but if the Chiefs of Staff could frame rules substantially conforming to the conditions laid down in this memorandum the Foreign Office could then submit them to the Secretary of State, and if a definite decision is taken to adopt a policy of retaliation the instructions could be sent to the Commander-in-Chief with a carefully drafted covering despatch so that he may himself realise, and thus be able to communicate to his subordinate commanders, the risks and dangers which we fear may attend the application of this policy and which must at all costs be avoided.
Foreign Office, May 3, 1927.
APPENDIX II.
(1.)
Decode Telegram from Mr. Newton (Hankow), No. 138, dated April 30, 1927.
ADDRESSED to Peking, No. 204.
Chinkiang telegram to Peking of 28th April.*
I have protested in writing in your name against this outrageous conduct by Nationalist troops.
I had understood from Rear-Admiral, Yangtse, that since Nanking outrages and irresistible firing to which all ships on the Yangtse are exposed, it had been decided that in default of Chinese protection British forces would be used where practicable to protect British lives and property at Hankow and elsewhere. If so, cannot British property at Chinkiang be protected by direct or retaliatory action there In the event of such action I should like, however, to be authorised to explain our policy beforehand to Chen on above lines.
(Repeated to Chinkiang and Shanghai for Commander-in-Chief.)
• See No 2 below.
(2.)
Decode Telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General (Shanghai), No. 145, of April 28, 1927.
FOLLOWING from Chinkiang, 28th April:-
Addressed to Peking; repeated to Foreign Office, Hankow and Commander-in-
Chief.
Despite protests of local authorities and proclamations issued under orders of General Chiang Kai-shek troops of 17th division of 6th Army this morning occupied consulate offices and residences.
Reported looting and destruction of foreign property in British concession has commenced.
172
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.